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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the likelihood of a nexus between 
economic growth and defense spending in Italy. With the US urging its NATO allies to stop 
“free-riding” through diminishing budget allocations to military expenses, and European 
policymakers hard-pressed by populist tail-winds, the debate on the effects of military 
expenditure on the economy is more current than ever. I briefly review the literature 
supporting each of the three possible effects: positive, negative, and insignificant. Scholars 
use various economic models like the Feder-Ram model (Biswan & Ram, 1986), the 
augmented Solow model (Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992), and endogenous growth models 
to investigate whether military spending affects economic growth and the degree and 
direction of causality. In this paper, Ido notutilize econometric models to establish a 
relationship between the two variables, but rather leverage on existing research and my 
analysis to formulate an educated guess. The relevant studies, on countries similarly 
industrialized, lean towards a negative or insignificant relationship between economic 
growth and defense expense. Based on the evidence presented in the paper, I postulate that 
the role of military expenditure on economic growth is insignificant in Italy. Nevertheless, 
investing in the national defense industry to consolidate and advance Italy’s ninth position 
as a global exporter of arms, would bring benefits regarding both balance of trade and 
strategic long-term partnerships. 
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1. Introduction 
arkets and economic prosperity require peace to thrive. For this reason, 
nations abide to the principle of deterrence as supported by Brodie (1959) 
to dissuade other nations to engage in militaryoffense. In the quest for 
this military power equilibrium, each year states allocate a budget for defense 
expenditures. The effect of this allocation on a country economic growth is object 
of considerable debate with no consensus thus far. Findings vary according to the 
econometric model used (Dunne, Smith, & Willenbockel, 2005), the sample 
composition in terms of country type and presence or absence of conflict, and 
whether this conflict is internal and external (Aziz & Asadullah, 2017). The three 
hypothesis are that the effect is either: positive, negative, or insignificant. Scholars 
hold that developed industrial economies find in general little marginal benefit 
from military expenditure as a mean to develophuman capital or support 
technology transfer to the private sector, aka “spin-offs” but are rather more 
negatively influenced by the negative effect of soaring public debt (Nikolaidou, 
2016). Studies on developing economies found instead more frequently a nexus 
between economic growth and military expense (Ajmair, et al., 2018; Chairil, 
Sinaga, & Febrianti, 2013), especially for the share allocated to military personnel 
(Ajmair et al., 2018), boosting aggregate demand. This last finding is consistent 
with the Keynesian approach that supports the nexus between increases in defense 
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expenditures and increases in employment and output as an effect of increased 
aggregate demand (Dunne, 2011). The neoclassical approach holds the opposite 
belief: more money allocated in defense means less capital available in the 
economy for private investment, due to the fact that the government would finance 
the military expense through additional taxes, with a direct effect on aggregate 
demand, leading to negativeeffects on the economic growth. A review of the three 
main hypothesis relative to the effect of military expenses on economic growth 
follows. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Positive effects 
On employment: Some scholars argue that military spending has a positive 
effect on job creation. And since the jobs in the military sector are paid less on 
average than those in the private sector, defense spending is considered to be more 
efficient at creating jobs. Scholars that found empirical evidence of the positive 
effects of defense spending on the economy are Mueller & Atesoglu (1993), 
Atesoglu (2002), Atesoglu & Mueller (1990). Quaresma & Rentschler (2004) 
found a positive effect on externalities such as job creation. Nancie & Cusack 
(1979) and Blank & Rothschild (1985) hold that defense spending in the US 
generates employment due to the large size of the US Armed forces.  
On technological innovation: Adams & Gold (1987), together with Gold (1990) 
and Sandler & Hartley (1995) defend that the investments in military technologies 
and R&D have positively impacted the private sector through technology transfer 
or “spin-offs.” 
On Foreign investment: Defense spending facilitates the attraction of foreign 
investment and international business (Sandler & Hartley, 1995) and provides 
insurance against war (Quaresma & Rentschler, 2004). 
 
2.2. Negative effects 
On the Production Possibility Frontier: Military spending appears to be 
responsible forindirect, delayed, negative effects on the US economy according to 
Goldstein (1988), Heo & Eger (2005), Mintz & Huang (1990, 1991), Ward & 
Davis (1992), Ward, Davis & Lofdahl (1995). Mintz & Huang (1990, 1991) defend 
that military spending and private investment compete over the same non-
consumption portion of the capital circulating in the economy, from here the 
tradeoff “guns versus butter” representing the tradeoff between the military and 
non-military spending. Melman (1983) holds that the arms manufacturers need 
highly skilled workers and engineers reducing their availability for civil industries.  
On Investments: Lindgren (1984) found that military expenditure decreases 
private investment in his study of twelve industrialized market economies. Also 
Faini et al., (1984) hold that military expenses absorb the resources needed to grow 
the economic output through a negative influence on investments.  
On Saving: Deger (1983) found a negative effect of military spending on 
savings. This is due to the increase in taxes to fund the military budget.  
 
2.3. Insignificant effects 
A third group of scholars found no statistically significative evidence that a 
relationship between military spending and economic growth exist. Payne & Ross 
(1992) and Kinsella (1990) found no evidence of causal relationship between 
military spending and economic growth. Gerace (2002) also didn’t find evidence 
supporting a causal relationship between the two variables and argued that it was 
due by the fact that military spending per capita in the US is not large enough 
tohave an impact on overall economic growth. Heo (2000) also found insignificant 
effects of military expenditure on economic growth in the United Stated during the 
period 1948 to 1996, even using different iterations of the Feder-Ram model of 
economic growth. Heo (2010) repeated this investigation by using the augmented 
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Solow model recommended by Dunne, Smith, & Willenbockel (2005), finding 
again a statistically insignificant relationship between defense spending and 
economic growth in the United States for the period 1954 to 2005.  
 
3. Global trends 
In 2017,the global military spending was $1.73 trillion or 2,2% of global gross 
domestic product (Tian, Fleurant, &Kuimova, 2018), representing a slight increase 
versus 2016 butstill in line with allocations following the end of the second gulf 
war in 2011.The decade 2001 to 2010,following the events of 9/11,saw an 
increment of the global military expenditure of 46% in real terms at constant 2010 
prices (World Bank, 2018) due to the combined effect of the increase of global 
GDP,+29%, and of military expenditure increase as a share of global GDP, +13%. The 
global economy has not reached its pre-crisis level of 2008 yet, however, it shows a 
slow but stable positive trend since 2014. Figure 1 shows graphically the constant 
decrease in military spending as a percentage of GDP in the last twenty years (the 
“peace dividend” following the end of the cold war) and the barely noticeable increase 
since 2014. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. EU military expenditure as % of GDP and EU GDP annual% growth, 1998-2017. 
Data from WorldBank (2018). 
 
4. The case of Italy 
In the last twenty years Italy has been keeping its defense budget around 1,7% 
of GDP, with a maximum of 1,96% in 2000, and a minimum of 1,38% in 2015. In 
the last five years, with the economy recovering slowly but consistently, Italy’s 
GDP grew 1,5% in 2017 but still lagging the European average GDP growth of a 
full percentage point.Figure 1 and Figure 2 show how Italy’s economic trend and 
military expense follow the European trend. The arms industry has a strategic role 
for Italy, being the ninth country in the world for arms exports according to a 
SIPRI report by Wezeman, et al., (2018). Italy is responsible for about 2,5% of the 
global arms exports, with an increase in market share of 13% in 2017 versus prior 
year (2018). Italy share of arms imported is a lower 1,5% (2018) which means Italy 
balance of trade in the defense compartment is positive. SIPRI (n.d.) estimates the 
overall value of the defense transfers to be $91,2 billions in 2015 (or €79 billion at 
the current exchange), leading to a net positive balance of €1 billion. 
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Figure 2. Italy military expenditure as % of GDP and Italy GDP annual % growth, 1998-
2017. Data from WorldBank (2018). 
 
Figure 2 also shows how the increase in military expense, incidentally, followed 
the GDP growth during the period 2012-2016 as Italy gradually recovered from the 
negative growth periods of 2008-2009 and 2012-2013. 
The data in Figure 2considers both the expense incurred by the Ministry of 
Defense (MoD) and the expense incurred by the Ministry of the Economic 
Development (MISE) for commissions to Italian defense suppliers.  
Italy official MoD expenses in 2017 amounted to 1,18% of GDP or €20,2 
billion, however, also the Ministry of Economic Development (MISE) allocates 
every year a budget for the purchase of military equipment that involves Italian 
weapons manufacturers. This budget isn’t accounted for in the official defense 
expenses measurement. In 2017, MISE allocated €3,325 billion, or about 3/4 of the 
its overall budget (Vignarca & Piovesana, 2018), for military project expenditures. 
MISE funded this allocation also by taking on mortgages with financial 
institutions, and the interest portion has soared to €427 million/year. This translates 
in an unbalanced help for the military sector which accounts only for 0,8% of GDP, 
with 121 companies, 50,000 workers and €15,2 billion of turnover (Vignarca & 
Piovesana, 2018). The remaining 137,000 small and medium-sized companies, 
with 3,9 million workers and €838 billion of turnover, worth about 50% of the 
Italian GDP are left with one-quarter of the MISE budget (2018, p.29). 
 
 
Figure 3. Italy-Defense budget allocation- 2018 estimate. Data retrieved from MILEX 
(2018). 
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5. Conclusion 
The latest analysis on the impact of military spending on growth for Italy 
support a negative effect during a 7-year period, 2005-2012, through the panel data 
analysis by Korkmaz (2015), and an insignificant/neutral effect during a 12-year 
period, 1988-2010, through the panel data analysis by Chang (2014). Scholars also 
support the insignificant effect hypothesis when there is:little or no extra-
employmentgenerated, with negligible effects on aggregate demand (Chan, 1995), 
and this would be the case for Italy since the number of military personnel is 
decreasing and expected to decrease further from the current 170,000 units to 
150,000 units in 2024 (Giglioli & Carnimeo, 2018; Rullo, 2016); none or 
lowperceived threat for which improved military spending would provide 
reassuranceand confidence forto the markets (Aizenman & Glick, 2006), another 
condition met with the defeat of ISIL, and the lack of imminent threats. 
According to the scholars’ analysis, the case of Italy leans towards a modest 
negative effect for military spending due to Italian high total public debt and the 
detrimental effect that Government expenses would have on private investment. 
Italy has voiced the intention to comply with the 2% level of military expense over 
GDP recommended by NATO (Youssef & Gordon, 2018), but at the moment, 
attention is on continuing personnel units reductions to simply re-equilibrate the 
current level of expenditure among personnel, investments, and operations (Figure 
3). With high levels of youth unemployment and lethargic economic growth in the 
south, public pressure and the populist political agenda in Italy push towards non-
military uses for the missing 0,5% of GDP that the US are requesting to their 
European NATO partners, making such allocation unlikely in the short term. 
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